Enforcement of water services payment for Mexican water utilities at the Mexico-US border by Aguilar Benitez, Ismael & Saphores, Jean-Daniel
 
 
SUMMARY FOR DECISION-MAKERS  
Number # 13   -    November, 2009 
 
Enforcement of water 
services payment for 
Mexican water 
utilities at the 
Mexico-U.S. Border 
 
Authors: Ismael Aguilar Benitez 
and Jean-Daniel Saphores 
El Colegio de la Frontera Norte and University 
of California Irvine (UCI) 
Figure 1. Geographical area covered by water utilities 




The Mexico-U.S. border region extends 3,300 km from the 
Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean.  On the Mexican side 
this region includes six states and more than 200 
municipalities with over 16 million inhabitants.  The northern 
border region is characterized by a fast growing population 
(the average annual population growth rate is 2.4%, whereas 
the Mexican average is 1.6%) and water scarcity: indeed, 
only between 1,200 m3 and 1,300 m3 of water per person per 
year are available. Even worse, according to the Mexican 
federal water agency (CONAGUA), the amount of water 
available will dip below 1,000 m3 per person per year in 2030, 
which implies a situation of water scarcity for human use.  At 
the same time, non-payment for water services is 
widespread, as approximately 30% of billed water is 
uncollected each year.   
 
Nonpayment of water services has serious environmental, 
economic and social consequences.  First, it tends to 
promote inefficient water use since delinquent households 
have no incentive to conserve water.  Second, the inability to 
expand municipal water services hurts the poorest people 
who are not connected to municipal water networks and need 
to buy their water from private water vendors, typically at 
much higher prices.  Finally, nonpayment compromises the 
financial self-sufficiency of water utilities by depriving them of 
much needed financial resources.  It is therefore urgent to 
improve water services management in this region. 
 
This study explores policies to enforce the payment of water 
services on the Mexican side of the border using cross-
sectional billing collection data and water utilities 
characteristics collected in 2008. We used municipal 
averages for income and socioeconomic variables.  Our main 
objective was to explore the effect of enforcement policies on 
the collection efficiency of these water utilities.  The main 
limitation of this study is that available data does not allow us 
to explain the causes of nonpayment at the household level. 
 
To collect data, we relied on a semi-structured questionnaire.  
This questionnaire included 40 questions organized in three 
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sections.  The first section focused on general characteristics 
of each water utility, the second section asked for billing and 
payment collection data, and the final section concentrated 
on utilities’ policies for dealing with nonpayment and late 
payment. The questionnaire was sent by mail and fax to 68 
Mexican water utilities located within 300 kilometers of the 
border.  We received complete answers from 35 water 
utilities.  The geographical area covered by our survey is 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
Our relatively small sample size (35 water utilities) precludes 
econometric analysis.  Therefore, the available data are 
explored descriptively by focusing on the main factors that 
might explain low collection rates.  For our analysis, we relied 
on graphs, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Pearson or 
Spearman correlation coefficients. 
 
Our results suggest that disconnection of residential accounts 
in arrears could be an effective measure to reduce 
nonpayment of water services.  However a policy of 
generalized disconnection is unfeasible because it would be 
costly and users may perceive it as unfair.  Alternatively, a 
policy of widely publicized, selective disconnection (for 
example focusing on delinquent residential accounts with six 
or more overdue bills) would be less costly and more 
effective. 
 
Based on the available data, it is not possible to determine a 
clear relationship between economic penalties and late 
payment. It is important to understand that water services are 
considered an entitlement rather than a service that needs to 
be paid for.  To foster payment, many border water utilities 
organize payment campaigns but these events, which offer 
substantial discounts to delinquent households, generate 
perverse economic incentives for nonpayment.  In fact, it is 
rational for households to withhold payment until the next 
campaign to pay their bills without any additional charge. 
 
An analysis of water utility characteristics suggests that the 
size of water utilities is not associated with nonpayment of 
water services.  Small water utilities have the same 
nonpayment problems as bigger water utilities.  This also 
implies that the lack of urban infrastructure is an unlikely 
factor for nonpayment.  Nevertheless, our results suggest 
that more payment options may reduce the percentage of 
residential accounts in arrears, so increasing payment 
convenience may reduce non-payment. Moreover, our data 
suggest that metering might also promote payment.  
However, the available time to pay does not appear to be a 
constraint that significantly affects the decision of households 
to pay for water services. 
 
Surprisingly, a larger disposable billing and collection staff is 
associated with a higher percentage of residential accounts 
in arrears.  One explanation may be that there are more 
political jobs in highly politicized utilities where enforcement is 
lax.  This finding suggests that low collection rates are also 
explained by institutional aspects of water utilities. An 
analysis of disconnection or suspension of water services 
confirms this hypothesis; in general, these measures are not 
applied systematically because of the uncertain legal context.  
Only in Coahuila, one of the five states included in this study, 
does the state water law set clear rules for the 
implementation of disconnection and suspension of water 
services.  As expected Coahuila is also the state with the 
smallest percentage of residential accounts with overdue 
bills.   
 
Enforcing payment for water services has several 
components that are complex to implement.  Although some 
factors such as metering and payment options may be 
improved, other aspects such as the perverse incentives of 
payment campaign are more difficult to eliminate.  This is 
unfortunate since enforcing the payment of water services 
may convey to users that water in this arid region is a very 
valuable resource that should be preserved and shared with 
nature. 
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